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ABSTRACT
Discontent with the functioning of the world monetary system has led to
many proposals for international monetary reform. These proposals range from
enhanced consultations under the current regime of floating exchange rates to a
regime of fixed exchange rates, as proposed by Ronald McKinnon. In this paper
we examine the implications of several alternative monetary arrangements for
fiscal policy in the world economy. In particular we focus upon two issues. The
first is the effects of alternative monetary arrangements on the international
transmission of fiscal policy. The second is the implications of the
alternative regimes for strategic aspects of fiscal policymaking.
As is generally the case in the discussion of exchange regimes we find
that the choice of the monetary system is crucially dependent upon the source
and nature of the shocks hitting the world economy. In this paper we show that
the monetary regime also has important implications for the transmission of
fiscal policy in the world economy and for the nature of the strategic games
played by fiscal authorities. Rigid rules of the game, as under fixed
exchange rates, do not necessarily eliminate the inefficient equilibria
that can occur when fiscal authorities behave non-cooperatively.
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I. Introduction
The volatility of the world economy since the breakdown of the Bretton
Woods par value system of exchange rates has led many policymakers and
economists to call for reform of the international monetary system. Many
economists have argued that domestic macroeconomic policies in the major OECD
economies should be geared, at least in part, to maintain exchange rates within
ranges set cooperatively among the major countries. Proposals vary from the
"target zone" system, as advocated by Williamson [1983] and Roosa [1984], to a
much more stringent system of fixed exchange rates, as advocated by McKinnon
[1984]. There are several possible arguments in the case for a return to a more
managed system, as described in recent surveys by Obstfeld [1985] and Sachs
[1985b]. One crucial argument has been that the equilibrium of noncooperative
macroeconomic policymaking under flexible exchange rates is likely to be
inefficient, as countries fail to take into account the external effects of
their policies on their trading partners. More rigid rules of thegame, as
embodied in a managed exchange rate system, are seen as away to reduce the
inducements to beggar-thy-neighbor policies. It has been frequently noted that
there are many institutional forms that greater cooperation might take, ranging
from the give and take of bargaining at economic summit meetings, to the
implicit form of cooperation that takes place when each country adheres to
externally imposed exchange rate targets. The exchange rate alternative is seen
as particularly attractive in that it reduces the needs for constant, face-to--—2—
face bargaining. Thehopeis that by changing the rules of the game,
policymakers can then be free to act independently (i.e. noncooperatively)
within the confines of the international agreement. Tighter margins for
exchange rate fluctuations might eliminate the most noxious forms of
international competition, in the same way that the GATT has significantly
reduced the international competition via tariff setting.
There are of course limits to the gains that will be achieved by a
change in the international rules of the game. Every set of exchange
arrangements will generate its own forms of strategic behavior, that will tend
to cause some forms of inefficient strategic behavior. For example, while much
of recent writing in this area has considered the gaming aspects of flexible
exchange rates (see Canzoneri and Gray [1985],. Oudiz and Sachs [1985], Currie
and Levine [1985], and the other studies in Buiter and Marston [1985]), many
others studies have shown that similar strategic issues arise in fixed exchange
rate systems. Indeed the original analytical work in this area, by Hamada
[1974], considered the case of monetary management under a fixed exchange rate
regime. Even the classical gold standard, the self-regulating system par
excellence, offered up incentives for inefficient strategic behavior, as argued
by Eichengreen [1985] and Matsuyama [1985]. An important aspect of research in
this area is to make quantitative judgements about the gains and losses from
alternative forms of exchange rate management.
This paper studies the properties of four alternative international
monetary regimes, both with respect to their operating characteristics, and with
regard to the incentives for strategic behavior under each regime. We consider.-3—
alternatively a floating exchange rate system as now, with three forms of fixed
exchange rate systems. In the floating rate system, we assume that policymakers
in each country can choose monetary and fiscal instruments in order to maximize
a national social welfare function, without having to gear the policy choices to
a particular exchange rate target. In the fixed exchange rate systems, some or
all of the countries are required to peg the exchange rate as a side condition
on their policy actions. We then study the implications of the exchange rate
constraints. However, we do not ask the more fundamental question as to whether
the exchange rate system itself would be viable, or instead whether the
countries would choose to bow out of the arrangement.
As -is well known, a fixed exchange rate system must be specified by much
more than the constraint that bilateral or multilateral rates be fixed. It is
crucial to specify which countries have the obligation to intervene in order to
preserve a given peg. The so-called "N-i problem" underlines the fact that in a
fixed regime of N countries, only N-i countries need to undertake the obligation
to stabilize. The N-th country, presumably, can act without direct regard for
the consequences of its policies on the exchange rate. The "problem", generally
speaking, is to decide how the responsibilities for pegging are allocated among
the countries.
We consider three alternatives that are widely discussed. The first is
an asymmetric "dollar standard", in which the United States assumes no
responsibility in pegging the exchange rate, while the other countries
(specifically Japan, and the rest of the OECO, named ROECD) both peg to the
dollar. This system makes the U.S. the "N-th" country, and is considered by-4-
many to be a easonable description of how the Bretton Woods system actually
operated (see Swoboda [1978]). In fact, it should be remembered that under the
Bretton Woods arrangement, the U.S. had the side condition topeg the dollar
price of gold at $35 per ounce, though it is difficult to find an important
ef-ect of this constraint on U.S. policy actions through most of the Bretton
Woods period.
The other two systems that we study are symmetric solutions to the N-i
problem, a la the gold standard. Recently, McKinnon [1984] has proposed a fixed
exchange rate arrangement for the U.S., Germany, and Japan, in which the cross
rates among these countries are fixed, and in which the weighted sum of the
money stocks of the three countries is to be held constant. This means that any
expansion of money in one country must be matched by a compensating contraction
in the other countries. Note that a strict gold standard, with a constant world
stock of gold reserves, would work this way: any increase inmoney in one
country (backed by 10096 gold reserves) would necessarily require a contraction
in money in rest of the world. Subject to this monetary constraint, the
countries would be free to pursue independent fiscal policies.
This monetary standard is extremely strict, in making theaggregate
stock of world money invariant to underlying conditions. As a third fixed
exchange rate arrangement, we experiment with a modified McKinnon plan (dubbed
McKinnon II) in which the exchange rates across regions are fixed, but in which
the weighted world money stock is controlled cooperatively by theparticipating
countries, to forestall large swings in world economic activity. Using a
numerical model later, we attempt to find an equilibrium set of rules for fiscal—5—
policy in each country and for the global money stock, which has thefollowing
properties: the fiscal rules are optimal for each country, takingas given the
fiscal rules in the other countries, and the rule for themanagement of the
global money stock, while at the same time, the cooperativemoney rule is
optimal taking as given the fiscal rules in each of the countries.
Within each of these exchange rate systems, weanalyze the behavior and
characteristics of fiscal policy, and examine how a changes in therules of the
game affect the incentives to use fiscal and monetary policies. In particular,
we examine whether the various inefficiencies of floating rates causedby the
strategic behavior of individual countries can be muted by a move toa more
managed system. Under various circumstances, it is true that amove to managed
rates can indeed blunt the inefficient deployment of fiscalpolicies, but we
also find that there are many circumstances in which the introductionof fixed
rates would itself lead to serious inefficiencies of other sorts. As iscommon
in this kind of research, the desirability of onetype of monetary arrangement
over another will depend importantly on the nature of the underlying shocks
hitting the world economy.
The paper is set out as follows. In section II, we examine the
transmission of fiscal policies under alternative exchange ratearrangements,
using an extremely simple version of the Mundell-Fleming model for heuristic
purposes. We then move on to a large-scale empirical model of the world
economy in section III, in which the same fiscal experiments are performed. We
find that the cross-country transmission of fiscalpolicy is affected in crucial
quantitative ways according to the global monetary arrangements in which the—6-
fiscal expansion takes place. In Section IV we take up the strategic aspects of
monetary and fiscal policies under the alternative monetary arrangements that we
are examining, and present illustrations -in which a return to fixed rates would
indeed raise the efficiency of macroeconomic management. In Section V the
large—scale empirical model is then used to study strategic aspects of
policymaking in a differential game format. We examine a game of disinflation,
in which all of the major economies begin the game with an excessively high
inflation rate, and in which all then use monetary and fiscal policies (subject
to the rules of the exchange regime) in order to dis-inflate optimally. Once
again, we confirm the crucial quantitative importance of alternative exchange
regimes for policy choices and macroeconomic outcomes. Finally, in Section VI,
we introduce a useful methodology for judging the "long-run't efficiency of
alternative forms of monetary arrangements. Some concluding remarks are offered
in Section VII.
II. Fiscal Policy Transmission in a simple Mundell—Fleming Model
We now introduce a simple, static two-country model in order to
illustrate the implications for fiscal policy of alternative monetary regimes.
We introduce the barest bones model here for illustrative purposes only, since
in the next section we study a richly specified and empirically calibrated model
of the world economy. It turns out, however, that even the simplest fixed price
model can give us a good understanding of the properties of the short-run policy
multipliers in the large-scale model.
Consider the following standard set—up, as in Mundell [1968]. We assume—7—
that domestic and foreign goods prices (p and p* )arefixed, and that there is
perfect capital mobility (i =i*).e is the exchange rate between the two
countries, in Units of the home currency per Unit of foreigncurrency. An
asterisk (*) denotes foreign country. The model is specified with twomoney
demand equations, and two IS curves. The notation is standard: m is(log) money
balances; p is (log) prices; q is (log) output; i is the nominal interestrate;
and g is the measure of fiscal policy. The equations are as follows:
m-p=qq-i (1)
m*-p*= qq* -i (2)
q =-o(p-e-p*)-ai+Ag+yq* (3)
q* =o(p-e-p*)-ai+Ag*+yq (4)
We assume, as is standard, that the interaction term in the ISequations, y, is
positive and less than one -invalue.We consider four monetary regimes, and
study the fiscal policy multipliers in each case. The regimes are:
(a) Floating exchange rate (the change -intheexchange rate, de, is
unrestricted, and pure fiscal policy is studied with dm =dm*=0)
(b) Dollar standard (U.S. monetary policy is held fixed, so that dm =0
and the foreign money supply adjusts endogenously so that de =0)
(c) McKinnon rule (the exchange rate is fixed, de =0,and a weighted
average of the money stocks mw =am +(1-a)m* is held fixed).—8—
(d) modified McKinnon rule (de =0,dmW is allowed to change).
We now turn to the fiscal policy multipliers.
(a) Floating Exchange Rate
The system (1)-(4) is differentiated and solved, along with the conditions that
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In this symmetric case fiscal policy ispositively transmitted across countries
(given that y <1) with the the country having the largest fiscalexpansion
experiencing an appreciation of its currency. Monetary policy isnegatively
transmitted, since a money supply expansion at home causes theexchange rate to
depreciate, and thereby shifts demand from the foreigncountry to the home
market.
b) Dollar Standard
The system is again solved,thistime using the assumptions that
de =0,dm exogenous, and dm* endogenous. In thiscase we find:
A
dq =— (dg+1dg*) + dm
A
A[ y -aq/] A [1 +4c/]
dq*= dg + dg*+ dm
A A A
4A[y- aq/$ -1] qA[1 -+




A foreign fiscal expansion is again transmittedpositively to the home country,
while a domestic fiscal expansion willactually be negatively transmitted if a4—10-
>f3-y.Thissurprising result occurs because the fiscal expansion by the home
country tends to appreciate the currency. The foreign country is thereby
required to undertake a monetary contraction in order to prevent its currency
from depreciating. The contractionary effects of this endogenous monetary
response can be sufficient to offset the normal expansionsary effect coming
through a rise in exports to the home country. Note that a rise -in home-country
money, dm >0,raises output in both countries, and induces a corresponding
increase in the foreign money supply.
There is admittedly something artificial in the way that we study this
case, in that g and g* are assumed to be exogenous, so that m* is the
"automatic instrument which the foreign country uses to peg the exchange rate.
If, for example, we were instead to assume that g* is altered to keep de =0,
then a home fiscal expansion (dg >0)would necessarily raise foreign output.
In the later empirical sections, the foreign country chooses the combination of
dg* and dm*optimally in order to maximize a social welfare function, subject to
the constraint that de =0.
c) McKinnon Rule
In the fixed exchange rate regime proposed by McKinnon [1984], the
exchange rate between the major countries would be fixed, together with an
exogenously set growth rate of a weighted average world money stock. The
implications of this regime for fiscal policy in this simple model can be found
by setting dmw =adm+(1_a)dm*as an exogenous variable, and requiring that
de =0.Monetary policy in both countries is endogenous. Doing this we find:—11—
A A [y/(1-a) -a
dq= dg +—
dg*
8 8 [a +/q(1-a)]
A A[y/a-a] dq*= —dg*+ dg
e[a+/qa]





Inthis case both home and foreign fiscalpolicies will be negatively transmitted
if o(1—a) >yfor a foreign expansion and a4a >yfor a domestic expansion.
The form of the monetary regime has been shownto have important
implications for the transmission of fiscalpolicy in the world economy. Later,
we will see that the nature of the transmission will
have important consequences
for policy coordination among themajor economies. In the next section we use a
large-scale simulation model in an attempt to betterquantify the fiscal policy
multipliers.—12—
III. Fiscal policy in an Empirical Model
In this section we use the MSG (McKibbin —Sachs Global) simulation model
to examine the international transmission of fiscal policy. The MSG model was
developed in Sachs and McKibbin [1985]. The reader is also referred to recent
papers by Ishii, McKibbin and Sachs [1985], McKibbin and Sachs [1985] and Sachs
[1985a] for several applications and refinements. The model is a rational
expections, dynamic general equilibrium macroeconomic model of the world
economy. A full list of equations is provided in the Appendix. The world
economy is divided into five regions consisting of the U.S., Japan, the rest of
the OECD (hereafter ROECD), OPEC and the Developing countries. Each region is
linked via flows of goods and assets. Stock-flow relationships and
intertemporal budget constraints are carefully observed. Budget deficits
cumulate into a stock of government debt which must eventually be financed,
while current account deficits cumulate into a stock of foreign debt. Asset
markets are forward looking so the exchange rate and long term interest rate are
conditioned by the entire future path of policy.
There are equations for the internal macroeconomic structure of the
three industrialized regions of the U.S., ROECO and Japan, while the OPEC and
developing country regions have only their foreign trade and financial
structures incorporated. Each region produces a good which is an imperfect
substitute in the consumption baskets of each of the other regions. Consumption
of each good therefore depends on income and relative prices. Private
absorption depends on financial wealth, disposable income and long-term and—13—
short-term real interest rates alongconventional lines. Nominalwages are
predetermined in each period, with the nominalwage change between periods a
function of lagged consumer priceinflation, the output gap and thechange in
the output gap. With theassumption that the GOP deflator is a fixedmarkup
over wages, we derive a standard Phillips
curve equation. In essence, the model
is a generalized version of theDornbusch [1976] model, in which thegoods
markets clear less rapidly than theasset markets.
Residents in different countries hold theirown country's assets as well
as foreign assets (except foreignmoney), based on the relative expected rates
of return, with expectations
being formed rationally. While we specify the
asset demand functions in a generalportfolio balance fashion, the parameter
values that we impose make the model behavealmost as if assets are perfect
substitutes. Money demand is specifiedaccording to a standard transactions
demand formulation.
The model is parameterized using actual1983 trade shares and asset
stocks. Behavioural parameters are chosento be consistent with values found in
the empirical literature. We have shownelsewhere (see Sachs [1985a]) that the
model is able to explain the macreconomic
experience of the 1980's including the
strong dollar and trade imbalances by shifts inmacroeconomic policies in the
U.S., Japan and the ROECD.
We simulate non-linear and linearversions of the model using numerical
techniques which take into account the forwardlooking variables in the model.
Specifically we use a procedure described by Fairand Taylor [1983]. The
linearized version of the model is
amenable to policy optimization exercises and-14-
has previously been used to consider the gains to policy coordination using
dynamic game theory techniques (see Sachs and McKibbin [1985]). Throughoutthe
paper we use the linearized version of the model becauseof the reliance on
dynamic programming in later sections. We have verified in earlier work that
there is little difference between the policy multipliers in the linearized and
nonlinear versions of the model in the exercises studied here.
A. Fiscal Policy Multipliers Under Alternative Regimes
We simulate a fiscal expansion by assuming a permanent 1 of GNP
increase in real government expenditures on domestic goods, commencing in 1984
which is financed by government debt. We assume that the expenditure increase
is permanent, and expected to be permanent on impact, with the budget deficit
remaining 1 of GNP above the baseline path. Because of rising interest
payments on the accumulating public debt, the deficit would tend to grow over
time in the absence of compensating cuts in expenditure or increases in taxes.
We assume that over time the increase in interest repayments is paid for through
higher tax revenues. Note that the economies all possess a steady state growth
rate of 3 percent per annum. In steady-state equilibrium, a constant deficit is
compatible with a fixed debt-GOP ratio as long as the increase in debt due to
the deficit causes the total debt stock to grow at the 3 percent annual rate.
This requirement means that the steady-state Debt—GOP ratio equals the
steady-state deficit-GOP ratio divided by 0.03. For example, a permanent
increase in the budget deficit, that raises the deficit from zero to 19 of GOP,
causes the steady-state debt-GOP ratio to rise from zero to 33 of GOP.—15-
Table 1 contains the results for a fiscal expansion in the U.S. under a
pure floating exchange rate. The absence of Ricardian consumers and the
presence of price stickiness is obvious -in the results. The real output
multiplier follows a familar hump shape: output rises initially, but over time
rising interest rates ,risingprices, a strong dollar, and rising taxes to
finance the growing debt burden, crowd out the fiscal stimulus. Crowding out
is complete by 1989. Note that the dollar appreciates on impact, by 3.3percent
against the ECU (the currency of the ROECD) and the Yen. Interest rates rise
throughout the world, although by more in the U.S. than abroad. The
differential in large part captures the expectation of a future depreciation of
the U.S. dollar (remember, though, that because of the portfolio balance
assumptions, there is also a slight and growing risk premium on dollar
denominated assets). The fiscal impulse is positively transmitted to the rest
of the world as Japanese and ROECO trade balances improve due both to the demand
stimulus from higher U.S. output, and from the strong dollar. The positive
transmission quickly fades as rising world interest rates have their effect.
Note that inflation initially falls in the U.S. This result follows from our
somewhat artificial assumption that home goods prices do not respond at all
within the first year to higher domestic output, while import prices fall in
response to the appreciation of the dollar.
Table 2 contains corresponding results for an ROECD fiscal expansion
under a flexible exchange rate. The results are similar to those for the U.S.
fiscal stimulus, with a positive transmission of output to the U.S. and Japan.
The ROECD exchange rate appreciates against the dollar by 3.4 percent on impact,—16—
TABLE 1U.S. Fiscal Expansion under a Flexible Exchange Rate
U.S. Economy:
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Real GNP 0.90.90.60.40.1 -0.1
Inflation D -0.20.20.30.40.40.4
Nominal Interest Rate D0.81.11.41.72.02.2
Exchange Rate (Ecu/$) 3.33.23.43.43.33.2
Trade Balance GNP -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 —0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Budget Deficit GNP 1.01.01.01.01.01.0
Money Supply 0.00.00.00.00.00.0
Japanese Economy:
Real GNP 0.60.20.1 -0.1 -0.2 —0.2
Inflation 0.20.40.30.30.30.2
Nominal Interest Rate D0.61.11.21.51.61.7
Exchange Rate (YEN/$) 3.33.13.23.23.12.9




Real GNP 0.80.10.0 -0.2 —0.3 —0.4
Inflation 0.20.50.30.30.20.2
Nominal Interest Rate D0.71.21.31.51.61.6
Trade Balance GNP 0.30.30.30.30.30.3
Budget Deficit 9GNP0.00.00.00.00.00.0
Money Supply 0.00.00.00.00.00.0—17-.
TABLE 2ROECO Fiscal Expansion Under a Flexible Exchange Rate
U.S. Economy:
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Real GNP 0.70.20.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5
Inflation D0.20.40.40.40.30.2
Nominal Interest Rate D0.61.21.41.61.71.7
Exchange Rate (Ecu/$) %—3.4—3.1 —3.1 —2.9 —2.6 —2.3




Real GNP %0.50.10.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4
Inflation 0.20.40.30.30.20.1
Nominal Interest Rate 00.41.01.21.41.41.4
Exchange Rate (YEN/$) -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8




Real GNP % 1.11.10.70.40.0 —0.4
Inflation —0.20.30.50.60.50.5
Nominal Interest Rate 00.91.42.02.42.62.8
Trade Balance %GNP -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Budget Deficit GNP 1.01.01.01.01.01.0
Money Supply 0.00.00.00.00.00.0—18—
and against the Yen by 3.1 percent on impact.
The results for a U.S. fiscal expansion under a dollar standard regime
are shown next in table 3. In specifying this regime, we make several crucial
assumptions. First, the comparative dynamic exercises assume that the non-U.S.
economies peg their exchange rates to the dollar via monetary policy, rather
than via fiscal policy. In other words, the U.S. fiscal multipliers assume that
foreign fiscal policies are held fixed, while foreign monetary policies are
wholly endogenous. Second, the form of monetary intervention must be made
clear. The authorities could choose to stabilize the exchange rate with
intervention on the foreign exchange markets or via intervention in the domestic
credit markets (e.g. open-market operations, rediscounting, etc.). In a world
of perfect capital mobility, all of these alternatives would be identical from
the point of view of macroeconomic outcomes, while in a world of imperfect
capital mobility, differences will arise depending on the nature of exchange
rate pegging. Since our model assumes very high, though not fully perfect
substitutability, the choice of intervention mechanism is quantitatively of
some, but only minor importance. In fact, in all of our specifications used in
the paper, we assume that the exchange rate is stabilized through interventions
in the domestic money market.
Several results are striking. The first is the negative transmission of
the U.S. fiscal expansion to the rest of the world. In this case both Japan and
the ROECD adopt severely contractionary monetary policies in order to maintain
the fixed exchange rate. The result is severe recession in both regions. The
recessionary effect of the contractionary monetary policies quickly feeds back—19—
TABLE 3U.S. Fiscal Expansion Under a Dollar Standard
U.S. Economy:
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Real GNP 1.70.60.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3
Inflation 00.00.60.30.1 -0.2 -0.4
Nominal Interest Rate 01.42.01.81.40.90.4
Exchange Rate (Ecu/$) % 0.00.00.00.00.00.0
Trade Balance %GNP -0.3 —0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8
Budget Deficit GNP 1.01.01.01.01.01.0
Money Supply ?60.00.00.00.00.00.0
Japanese Economy:
Real GNP % -1.0 —1.6 -1.6 -1.4 -0.80.0
Inflation 0.0 —0.5 -0.9 —1.2 —1.4 -1.3
Nominal Interest Rate 01.41.9 1.7 1.30.80.2
Exchange Rate (YEN/$) 0.00.00.00.00.00.0
Trade Balance %GNP0.10.10.10.10.20.3
Budget Deficit %GNP0.00.00.00.00.00.0
Money Supply -1.0 -2.5 -3.8 -4.9 -5.8 —6.4
ROECO Economies:
Real GNP % -2.1 —3.2 -2.7 -1.60.22.4
Inflation 0.0 -0.8 -1.5 -1.9 -1.9 -1.4
Nominal Interest Rate D1.41.91.71.20.50.0
Trade Balance %GNP0.20.40.50.60.60.5
Budget Deficit %GNP0.00.00.00.00.00.0
Money Supply % -1.4 -3.6 -5.7 -7.2 -8.0 -7.8—20—
to the U.S., and does much to dampen the U.S. fiscal multiplier (it turns
negative by 1987). The asymmetry -in the dollar standard regime -is illustrated in
table 4, which shows the results for an ROECD fiscal expansion. In contrast to
the U.S. fiscal expansion, the ROECD fiscal expansion is positively transmitted
to the rest of the world. The Ecu tends to appreciate, so that the ROECD
monetary authorities are obligated to expand the domestic money supply. This
leads to an enormous expansion in the ROECO, and positive transmission to the
other economies.
Table 5 illustrates the consequence of a fiscal expansion under the
McKinnon regime. In this case, we study the effects of a fiscal expansion under
the assumption that a geometric weighted average of the money supplies in the
U.S., ROECD, and Japan is fixed, and that the exchange rates are similarly
fixed. The weights used (somewhat arbitrarily) are the GNP weights for 1983. In
this case, as with the U.S. expansion under the dollar standard, the
transmission of fiscal policy is negative. Once again, the non-U.S. economies
are obligated to contract their money stocks while the U.S. expands its money
stock. The result is a rise in interest rates abroad that is sufficient to
overwhelm the direct effects of the U.S. stimulus. The extent of the recession
abroad is less than in the Dollar standard, since in the McKinnon case, the U.S.
is obligated to expand its money supply in line with the fiscal expansion.
The effects of an ROECD fiscal expansion under the McKinnon rule are
shown in table 6. Now the ROECD fiscal expansion is negatively transmitted to
the rest of the world. Clearly, the McKinnon rule on world money supplies
imposes more symmetry than does the dollar regime. In the case of an ROECD—21—
TABLE 4ROECD Fiscal Expansion Under a Dollar Standard
U.S. Economy:
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Real GNP %0.10.50.60.50.1 —0.5
Inflation o0.00.20.50.70.90.8
Nominal Interest Rate 00.10.61.32.23.03.4
Exchange Rate (Ecu/$) %0.00.00.00.00.00.0
Trade Balance GNP 0.30.40.60.70.70.6
Budget Deficit GNP 0.00.00.00.00.00.0
Money Supply % 0.00.00.00.00.00.0
Japanese Economy:
Real GNP 0.50.90.80.60.1 -0.5
Inflation % 0.10.40.71.0 1.10.9
Nominal Interest Rate D0.10.5 1.2 2.02.73.0





Real GNP %4.74.53.21.]. -1.6 -4.3
Inflation %0.11.82.62.82.41.5
Nominal Interest Rate D 0.].0.8 1.72.83.84.4
Trade Balance %GNP -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
Budget Deficit 96GNP1.01.01.01.01.01.0
Money Supply % 1.74.26.27.57.87.0TABLE 5U.S. Fiscal Expansion
—22—
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TABLE 6ROECO Fiscal Expansion Under the McKinnon Rule
U.S. Economy:
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Real GNP -0.6 —0.8 -0.6 -0.30.00.4
Inflation o0.0 —0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 —0.1
Nominal Interest Rate 00.9 1.51.82.02.01.9
Exchange Rate (Ecu/$) %0.00.00.00.00.00.0
Trade Balance %GNP0.20.30.40.50.60.5
Budget Deficit %GNP0.00.00.00.00.00.0
Money Supply —0.6 -1.5 -2.2 -2.7 -2.9 -2.8
Japanese Economy:
Real GNP %-0.2-0.4 -0.3 —0.2 —0.10.0
Inflation 0.10.00.00.00.00.0
Nominal Interest Rate D0.91.41.71.81.81.6
Exchange Rate (YEN/$) %0.00.00.00.00.00.0
Trade Balance %GNP0.20.30.40.40.40.3
Budget Deficit %GNP0.00.00.00.00.00.0
Money Supply -0.5 -1.0 —1.5 -1.7 —1.8 -1.7
ROECO Economies:
Real GNP %3.12.31.50.4 -0.8 —1.8
Inflation 0.01.21.41.41.10.7
Nominal Interest Rate 00.91.62.12.52.72.8
Trade Balance GNP -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6
Budget Deficit %GNP1.01.01.01.01.01.0
Money Supply 0.81.82.73.33.53.4—24—
fiscal expansion under the McKinnon rule, the U.S. and Japan contract monetary
policy and the ROECD expands monetary policy in order to maintain the fixed
exchange rate. The consequence of the contractionary monetary policies is to
cause a recession in Japan and the U.S.
IV. Implications of the Exchange Regime for Strategic Interactions of Monetary
and Fiscal Policy
As we noted in the beginning, one of the most attractive aspects of
monetary reform is the possibility of reducing the inefficient strategic
behavior of national macroeconomic authorities. It is well known that if
policymakers in the U.S., the ROECD, and Japan independently select their
monetary and fiscal policies, taking as given the actions of the other
countries, the resulting (Nash) equilibrium of macroeconomic policies is likely
to be inefficient, -in the sense that another vector of policy parameters could
simultaneously raise the level of social welfare in all of the countries. In
this brief theoretical section, we illustrate how a change of regime could
possibly make the independent actions of national policymakers more efficient.
Consider an illustration in which two symmetric countries choose
monetary and fiscal policies to maximize a social welfare function in output,
the fiscal deficit, and the level of prices (in the dynamic model, the target
will be the inflation rate). For simplicity, we assume that the welfare
functions are identical and of the following quadratic form:
W=_(q2+J1P2+Vg2) (5)—25—
where PC is the (log) level of consumer prices (the foreign welfare functionis
of course a function of the corresponding foreign variables). The blisspoints
for each country are zero levels of (log) output, consumerprices, and fiscal
expenditure. We use the earlier static model of Section II, with the addition
that consumer prices in each country are a weightedaverage of home prices and
import prices (valued in domestic currency):
(1-a) (p*+e)
p*+ (1 -v)(p -e)
Maintaining the assumption that domestic and foreign output prices are Hxed,
with p =p*=
p0.we have that fluctuations in the exchange rate is the only
factor that can cause PC and to change in the short run.
In the case of symmetric countries, it will necessarily be the case that
the exchange rate equals zero (e =0).Given this fact, consumer prices in each
country are fixed at the level p0. Since p cannot be reduced in both countries
simultaneously, the best symmetric solution is merely to live with the fact that
is above the bliss level, and then to set g =g*=0,and m =m*=p0.so
that output is kept at q =q*=0.In other words, the economies should Sit at
"full employment" and zero budget deficit, suffering the inevitable fact that
consumer prices are above their bliss level.
Unfortunately, in noncooperative policymaking under floating exchange
rates, this efficient equilibrium will not be reached. Each country's policy—26—
authorities will believe that a strong currency option is available that will
allow them to reduce p, and therefore to import price stability (and to export
inflation!). Each country will therefore aim its monetary policy in a
contractionary direction and its fiscal policy in an expansionary direction in
order to exploit the possible anti-inflationary gains of a strong currency. Of
course, this noncooperative outcome has all of the trappings of a prisoners'
dilemma game, in that both symmetric countries will not be able, simultaneously,
to each enjoy a strong currency vis-a-vis the other! The results of the
noncooperative game will therefore be:
(1) a policy mix geared towards fiscal expansion cum monetary
contraction, with a socially undesirable level of fiscal deficits;
(2) overly contractionary policies in total, with output reduced below
the efficient symmetric level of q =q*=0.
(3) an exchange rate e =0,with PC = = p0.i.e., no success -in
either Country of manipulating the exchange rate to its own advantage.
These results are easy to confirm algebraically. The home Country
maximizes the social welfare function (5) with respect to m and g, taking as
given the level of m* and g*. The foreign country makes the comparable policy
analysis, arriving at values of m* and g*, taking as given m and g. At the Nash
equilibrium -in this symmetric case, m =m*and g =g*,with the specific values
of the target variables given as follows (note that the multipliers dy/dx in the
equations are as given -in the derivations in Section II):—27—
q =q*=-[ji p0(1 -n)(de/dm)]/(dq/dm)< 0
0
g =g*=-[q(dq/dg) + jip(1 -)(de/dg)]/v> 0
Remember that de/dm > 0, de/dg < 0, dq/dm > 0, dq/dg >0, in order to derive the
signs of the preceeding expressions. Thus, output is below zero, while
government spending is above zero. By simple substitution, it is easy to see
that m =m*< p0. In sum we have established the early conclusions: m is too
tight and g is too loose relative to the efficient equilibrium, and aggregate
demand overall -is too tight (since q =q*< 0).
It is important to note that the inefficiency in this game would hold if
the players had only one instrument, either m or g, instead of two. If m and m*
were fixed, with the authorities setting g and 9*, there would still be a bias
towards inefficiently large fiscal deficits; while on the contrary, ifg and g*
are fixed, while the game is played with m and m*, then the bias is towards
overcontractionary policies. In both cases, the countries attempt to manipulate
the exchange rate in their favor (i.e. towards an appreciation).
Now, consider how this game would be played under the McKinnon standard.
In that case, policymakers choose only g and g*, since monetary policy is set
according to the two rules that mW is fixed and that the exchange rate is fixed
(in this case at e =0).The cooperative optimum equilibrium is again the same,
with q =q*=0,g =g*=0,and PC = = p0.To achieve this equilibrium, mW
should be set at p0. and fiscal policy in both countries should be set at zero.—28—
Assume now that the McKinnon rule is in place, but with each fiscal
policy authority free to choose the level of fiscal spending in a noncooperative
way. Suppose also that mW is fixed exogenously at p0 (more on this assumption
in a moment). It now turns out that the independent actions of the fiscal
authorities will lead to the social optimum. The policymaker has no incentive
to try to deviate from the point of zero fiscal expenditure. Higher fiscal
spending no longer improves the price performance, as it did under the floating
system, since now the exchange rate is fixed at zero. Therefore fiscal
expenditure merely worsens the budget deficit without any compensating benefits.
These results are verified formally by maximizing the social welfare function at
home with respect to g, and abroad with respect to g*. It is easy to verify
that g =g*=0constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
To see this formally, we simply differentiate the utility function with
respect to g, and set the results equal to zero. Under the McKinnon rule, de/dg
=0,so that the result of differentiation is: dW/dg =0=-[q(dq/dg)+vg].
With mW at p0. and g* =0,this first—order condition is satisfied at q =0,and
g =0.The same result holds for the foreign country when g =0,so that the
pair g =g*=0constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Thus, we have a case in which a change in monetary regime eliminates the
inefficient strategic interactions of the two governments. The essential
inefficiency of the game under floating resulted from the fact that the two
sides had inconsistent exchange rate targets, that obviously could not be
simultaneously satisfied. Under the McKinnon rules, neither player attempts nor
-isableto influence the exchange rate in his favor. It must be stressed that—29—
the efficiency of the McKinnon solutionrelied heavily on two facts. First, it
was assumed that the world money stock mwwas at the global optimum. In fact,
McKinnori has opted for a fixed level of mw-in most discussions of hisproposal,
and there is no reason to believe thatthe selected value of mi" would
necessarily be at an efficient level. Second, thesymmetry of the model and the
symmetry of the "shock" (both countries had pricesequally above the optimum)
meant that the exchange rate did not haveto adjust in order to adapt
efficiently to the shock. In later sections,
we will study asymmetric cases, in
which efficiency requires a change inthe nominal exchange rate.
V. Strategic Interactions Under AlternativeRegimes j the MSG Model
We now employ the large-scale simulationmodel to study strategic
interactions in the dynamic case. For thispurpose we use two types of
methodologies. In the first, we place the countriesin a particular historical
situation, and study the optimalstrategies of each country over time. A
benchmark "cooperative" equilibrium is usedas a benchmark with which to compare
the performance in the alternativemonetary regimes. In the second and more
novel approach, introduced in SectionVI, we study the asymptotic properties of
the system under alternativeexchange arrangements. In that case we assume that
the system is buffeted through timeby various stochastic disturbances, in
output markets, money markets, and elsewhere.Using a technique described in
that section, we can calculate the
steady-state variance-covariance structure of
the target variables in eachexchange regime, and thereby measure theaverage
operating properties of each system. Ingeneral, the MSG model is particularly—30—
well suited to this kind of analysis, since the model is easilyreducible to a
first-order difference equation system, which is easy to analyze usingstandard
techniques of dynamic analysis.
*
Tostudy the dynamic games involved in setting national policy we
specify a social welfare function for each of the three OECO regions.Social
welfare in each region is specified as a function of various macroeconomic
targets, such as the inflation rates, the GOP gap, the currentaccount deficit,
and the budget deficit. The intertemporal social welfare functions are written
as additively separable quadratic functions of the targetsin each period. The
specific form that we employ makes social welfare a functionof the output gap
Q,CPIinflation it,thecurrent account deficit as a percent of GOP, denoted CA,
and the level of the budget deficit relative to GOP, denoted D. The specific
function that we employ is as follows:
2 2 2 2
W =— o[0.5+ ir + 0.5CAt +0.6 (6)
t=O
& is the social rate of time discount. Clearly, macroeconomic "bliss" is
achieved when the GDP gap is zero, CPI inflation is zero, the current account is
in balance, and the budget is in balance.
Corresponding welfare functions are assumed for ROECO and Japan. A
couple of preliminary comments should be made about this welfarefunction.
First, the results are obviously specific to a given numerical specification.
The inefficiency of a strategic noncooperative interaction will depend—31—
quantitatively on the weights attached to the countries' target variables. In
the simple example of the last section, for example, theinefficiency resulted
from the fact that both countries were attemptingsimultaneously to reduce their
price levels, via exchange rate appreciation. The inefficiency of the
noncooperative solution in that case depends crucially on the relativeweight
placed by the countries on the inflation target. Forpurposes of study of our
large-scale model, we have not yet determined anyway to study the dynamic games
except through the specification of particular loss functions. The secondpoint
is that the loss function relates to macroeconomictargets (inflation,
unemployment, etc.) rather than to more basic categories of realconsumption
over time. Our model does not have strong enough microeconomic foundationsat
this point to write policy targets in terms of the"primitives" of consumption
expenditure, as might be desirable in a more sophisticated treatments.
Using results of dynamic game theory, we calculate (with numerical
dynamic programming methods) a set of fiscal policy rules in the threeOECD
regions that have the following "equilibrium" property: the rules for each
country are optimal for the given country (in that they maximize thedynamic
social welfare function), taking as given the rules thatare being employed in
the other regions. A more rigorous statement of theequilibrium conditions and
a discussion of the solution technique is given in Oudiz and Sachs[1985). The
optimum we calculate it time consistent. That is, there is no incentiveto
choose a different set of policies if the optimizationproblem is solved again
at some point in the future. The policies are therefore also credibleto the
forward looking private agents and other countries in the model.We have shown—32-.
elsewhere (see Sachs and McKibbin [1985]), that as in the static model of the
previous section, such an equilibrium does not necessarily yield very attractive
outcomes. These rules will likely contain some types of beggar-thy-neighbor
policies, and will therefore show some of the disadvantages of the classic
prisoners' dilemma. For example, in the case where both monetary and fiscal
policies are chosen according to such rules under a flexible exchange rate
regime, we will see that the equilibrium rules are likely to produce excessive
budget deficits and high real interest rates in an inflationary environment,
just as we found for the static model.
It is therefore very likely the case that the social welfare of all of
the countries can be enhanced by a different set of policies, chosen
cooperatively. We can find such a set new rules by assuming that a single
"world" planner maximizes a single social welfare function, which is a weighted
average of the social welfare functions of the U.S., Japan, and the ROECD, where
the weights are GNP shares. The result of this global optimization is a new set
of rules that avoids prisoners' dilemmas. These optimal "cooperative" rules can
then be compared with the "non-cooperative" rules found in the first stage. In
general, it will be the case that "cooperative" policies result in some form of
managed float, in that global efficiency of policy setting will almost surely
require changes in the nominal exchange rates of the three countries in the
course of macroeconomic adjustment.
We use this technique to generate non-cooperative rules for fiscal
policy given the monetary regime in place, as well as a set of cooperative
rules. In the case of the flexible exchange rate regime we assume that—33—
policymakers choose both monetary and fiscal policies to reach targets for
output, inflation, the current account and budget deficits. In the dollar
standard case the U.S. is allowed to optimize on both monetary and fiscal
policies whereas Japan and the ROECO are only given the option of choosing
fiscal policy. Their money supplies are made endogenous, and set at the levels
necessary to keep the exchange rate unchanged, given the levels of the state
variables of the world economy, and given the levels of their own fiscal
policies, and of the monetary and fiscal policies in the other economies. In
the McKinnon regime, each region chooses fiscal policy to reach its given
targets. In the "simple" McKinnon regime, the global money stock is held fixed,
while in the "modified" McKinnon regime, the three regions cooperatively set the
global money stock, m', while they choose their fiscal policies independently.
In each case the dynamic welfare function is the one that we have just
introduced.
A word must be said about how we implement the modified McKinnon
proposal. Remember that in that case, the global money stock is set
cooperatively, while the individual countries set the fiscal policies
noncooperatively. To find a "good" rule for the global money stock, we employed
the following iterative procedure. We found the rule for global money that
maximizes a global social welfare function (a GNP-weighted average of the
individual region social welfare functions) assuming that fiscal policies were
also chosen cooperatively. Then, given the resulting rule for global money, we
let the individual policymakers choose optimal fiscal policies in a
noncooperative manner. Taking as given these resulting rules for fiscal policy,—34—
we then recalculated an optimal cooperative rule for global money, and used that
one as the rule to control the evolution of mW. Ideally, it would be best to
find the linear rule for mW that maximizes the global welfare, subject to the
constraint that the fiscal rules are choosen noncooperatively by the separate
regions. This formulation would make the cooperative monetary authorities
Stackelberg leaders with respect to the fiscal authorities of the individual
countries. Unfortunately, we have not yet been able to implement this more
ambitious approach.
As a formal matter, the MSG model can be written -in a standard state















is a vector of state variables (in this case 37x1)
Ut is a vector of control variables
e is a vector of non—predetermined (or "jumping") variables
Ttisa vector of target variables
is a vector of stochastic shocks (9x1)
is the expectation taken at time t of the jumping variables at
time t+1 based on information available at time t
The model variables are divided into state variables X, historically given at
any moment; "jumping" or forward-looking variables e. which are fixed in order—35—
to place the system on the stable dynamic manifold; control variables
Ut including fiscal and monetary policies; and stochastic shocks •Assuming
that in each period the policy variables must be set before the stochastic
shocks are observed, the policy rules are all written in the form:
=r (10)
In other words, the general specification of rules links the control variables
to the state variables in any period via a fixed set of linear rules. Of course
the linearity results from the assumption of linearity of the underlying model
and the assumption of a quadratic social welfare function in each region.
The dynamic game that we study in this section has the policy
authorities all confronting an unanticipated jump in nominal wage inflation of
10 percent per year, after being on a baseline path of zero inflation, zero GDP
gap, budget balance, and current account balance. The shock hits in 1984,
raising domestic prices in the year by 10 percent, and setting in motion several
years of high inflation given the inflationary momemtum built into the Phillips
curve equation (which makes current nominal wage change a function of lagged
nominal price change). In each region, monetary and fiscal policies are
deployed in order to engineer an optimal rate of disinflation, subject to the
social welfare function (which trades off output, inflation, budget, and current
account deficits) and subject to the policy rules taken abroad. In this
analysis, we assume that the system is nonstochastic (that is, allare zero),
returning to the stochastic case in the next section when we look at the—36--
steady-stateoperating properties of the alternative regimes.
Table 7 illustrates the case of optimal cooperative disinflation. Since
all countries begin with a shock of 10 percent wage inflation, it is optimal to
pursue tight macroeconomic policies -in order to bring inflation down to zero in
the period of a few years. In this case, the nominal money stock growth -iskept
low and falling, so that real money balances (not shown) fall sharply in the
early period of disinflation. Since domestic prices in each of the three
regions has risen by 10 percent in 1984, the fact that nominal money stocks are
falling in 1984 relative to the baseline means that real money balances are
declining by more that 10 percent in 1984, i.e. that monetary policy is highly
nonaccomodative in the year of the price shock. Also, fiscal policy is
restrictive in the U.S. (where there is a surplus of 0.5 percent of GNP in 1984),
and Japan (where there is a surplus of 0.8 percent of GNP), while fiscal policy
is neutral in the ROECD. In all countries, there is a sharp recession in 1984
of about 10 percent of GOP relative to potential, and actual GOP reapproaches
its potential level only slowly over time. Note that because of the monetary
stringency, there is a sharp rise in nominal short—term interest rates, with
interest rates rising by 15.4 percentage points in the U.S. in 1984, by 16.1
percentage points in Japan, and by 14.8 percentage points in the ROECD.
Interest rates fall gradually over time, in line with the gradual disinflation.
Table 7 showed the optimal cooperative response. Now table 8 shows what
happens when policy makers act independently and noncooperatively, under a
regime of floating exchange rates. Suddenly, everybody tries to maintain a
strong currency in order to help fight off the inflationary shock. Each country—37—
TABLE 7Cooperative Response to an Inflationary Shock Under a Flexible
Exchange Rate
U.S. Economy:
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Real GNP -10.1 -8.0 -6.4 -5.2 -4.1 -3.3
Inflation D10.05.94.83.83.02.4
Nominal Interest Rate 015.4 12.39.77.66.15.0
Exchange Rate (Ecu/$) 0.60.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.4 -1.9
Trade Balance GNP 0.20.20.10.10.10.1
Budget Deficft GNP -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.10.0
Money Supply *—0.82.06.9 12.2 17.0 21.2
Japanese Economy:
Real GNP —9.8 -7.9 -6.4 -5.1 -4.2 -3.4
Inflation %9.25.44.43.52.92.3
Nominal Interest Rate 016.1 12.9 10.07.86.24.9
Exchange Rate (YEN/$) -5.1 —4.5 -3.9 -3.5 —3.3 —3.1
Trade Balance GNP -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2
Budget Deficit %GNP-0.8 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2
Money Supply %—1.10.85.3 10.3 15.0 19.0
ROECD Economies:
Real GNP -10.3 -8.0 -6.4 -5.1 —4.0 -3.2
Inflation 9.95.84.63.62.92.3
Nominal Interest Rate D14.8 11.68.96.85.34.2
Trade Balance %GNP 0.40.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2
Budget Deficit GNP 0.00.00.00.00.0 -0.1
Money Supply —0.52.37.3 12.6 17.4 21.4—38—
TABLE 8Non-Cooperative Response To an Inflationary Shock Under a Flexible
Exchange Rate
U.S. Economy:
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Real GNP 6-10.2—8.0 —5.4 —5.2 —4.1 —3.3
Inflation D 9.95.94.73.83.02.4
Nominal Interest Rate D19.3 14.7 11.89.47.76.3
Exchange Rate (Ecu/$) 1.50.5 —0.1 -0.7 -1.2 -1.7
Trade Balance ?GNP 0.20.10.10.10.10.1
Budget Deficit GNP 1.30.80.60.60.50.4
Money Supply —2.5 —0.14.9 10.3 15.3 19.6
Japanese Economy:
Real GNP -10.1 -7.8 -6.3 -5.1 -4.1 -3.3
Inflation 9.15.34.33.52.82.3
Nominal Interest Rate D19.9 15.6 12.7 10.38.67.3
Exchange Rate (YEN/$) -5.2 -4.6 -4.1 -3.7 -3.5 -3.3
Trade Balance GNP -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3
Budget Deficit GNP 1.40.90.70.60.50.5
Money Supply —2.9 -1.42.87.8 12.5 16.6
ROECO Economies:
Real GNP —10.3 -8.0 -6.3 -5.0 -4.0 -3.2
Inflation 10.05.84.63.72.92.3
Nominal Interest Rate 018.3 14.0 11.18.97.25.9
Trade Balance %GNP 0.60.30.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
Budget Deficit GNP 1.61.00.80.60.50.5
Money Supply %—2.10.55.5 10.9 15.8 19.9—39-.
therefore has more expansionary fiscal policy than in the cooperative solution
(the U.S. for example runs a budget deficit of 1.3 percent of GNP in 1984) and
has more contractionary monetary policy than in the cooperative case. The
result is that noncooperation under floating leads to very high world interest
rates, since the whole world is tilted towards fiscal expansion and monetary
contraction. U.S. nominal interest rates jump by 19.3 percentage points in the
noncooperative floating rate case, whereas they increased by only 14.8
percentage points -in the cOoperative policy response.
In Tables 9 and 10 we ask what happens when the same shock occurs in a
regime of fixed exchange rates, first under a dollar standard, and then under a
modified McKinnon rule. The notable point about the dollar standard is that the
U.S. still has an incentive to pursue fiscal expansion and monetary contraction,
just as under the floating rate case. A fiscal expansion in the U.S. reduces
output abroad (we noted the negative transmission -in Sections II and III), and
thereby lowers foreign inflation. Lower foreign inflation in turn lowers U.S.
import prices. Similarly, a U.S. monetary contraction has the same side-effect.
Thus, the U.S., as center of monetary system, shifts its policy mix in a
direction intended to promote very sharp disinflation abroad. In the other
countries, expansionary budget policies are undertaken defensively, in order to
limit the extent of disinflation and economic contraction implicit in the U.S.
policies. The result is that, like the floating rate case, each country is led
to pursue a policy mix of large budget deficits and very contractionary monetary
policies. World interest rates shoot up, and the world falls moves into
recession.—40—
TABLE 9Non—Cooperative Response to an Inflationary Shock Under a Dollar
Standard
U.S. Economy:
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Real GNP -10.5 —8.3 —6.6 —5.2 -4.1 -3.3
Inflation 0 9.95.74.53.52.82.2
Nominal Interest Rate D22.8 18.1 14.4 11.59.37.6
Exchange Rate (Ecu/$) 0.00.00.00.00.00.0
Trade Balance GNP 0.20.10.00.0 -0.10.0
Budget Deficit ?6GNP 2.82.2 1.91.51.31.1
Money Supply —4.2 —2.72.07.5 12.7 17.1
Japanese Economy:
Real GNP -9.8 —7.7 -6.2 -5.0 —4.1 -3.4
Inflation %9.75.84.73.73.02.4
Nominal Interest Rate 022.8 18.2 14.6 11.79.68.0
Exchange Rate (YEN/$) 0.00.00.00.00.00.0
Trade Balance GNP 0.10.0 —0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4
Budget Deficit GNP 1.30.90.70.60.60.5
Money Supply 9-4.1 —2.52.47.9 13.1 17.6
ROECD Economies:
Real GNP %—10.7-8.1 -6.3 —4.8 -3.8 -2.9
Inflation %9.85.64.53.62.92.4
Nominal Interest Rate 022.8 18.4 15.0 12.3 10.28.6
Trade Balance GNP 0.40.20.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
Budget Deficit %GNP 4.43.22.51.91.41.0
Money Supply —4.3 -2.91.77.2 12.4 17.0—41—
TABLE 10Non-Cooperative Response to an Inflationary Shock Under the McKinnon
Rule
U.S. Economy:
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Real GNP -10.0 —8.0 —6.5 -5.2 —4.2 —3.4
Inflation 0 9.95.94.73.73.02.3
Nominal Interest Rate 016.6 13.3 10.68.46.85.6
Exchange Rate (Ecu/$) 0.00.00.00.00.00.0
Trade Balance GNP 0.10.10.00.00.00.0
Budget Deficit %GNP 0.20.30.40.40.40.4
Money Supply -1.21.26.0 11.2 16.0 20.1
Japanese Economy:
Real GNP —8.3 —7.0 —6.0 -5.1 —4.4 —3.8
Inflation 9.76.35.24.23.3 2.6
Nominal Interest Rate D16.6 13.1 10.27.96.25.0
Exchange Rate (YEN/$) 0.00.00.00.00.00.0
Trade Balance GNP -0.].-0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
Budget Deficit %GNP-1.3 -1.1 -0.9 -0.7 -0.4 -0.2
Money Supply -0.72.47.7 13.2 18.3 22.5
OECD Economies:
Real GNP —10.5 -8.1 —6.3 —5.0 -3.9 —3.0
Inflation %9.85.74.53.73.02.4
Nominal Interest Rate 016.6 13.3 10.68.46.85.6
Trade Balance GNP 0.30.10.0 -0.]. -0.1 -0.1
Budget Deficit GNP 1.20.90.70.50.20.1
Money Supply -1.40.85.6 10.8 15.7 19.9—42-.
Table 10, under the Modified McKinnon regime, shows the advantage of
this regime in fighting a global inflationary shock. As we saw in the
theoretical analysis of Section IV, countries no longer have the incentive to
run large budget deficits under the McKinnon regime, since they know that they
cannot get disinflationary benefits from such a policy mix. Therefore, they all
choose to have lower budget deficits than -in the noncooperative equilibrium
under floating, and than in the noncooperative equilibrium under the dollar
standard. In this sense, the shift -in regime almost substitutes for the
cooperation assumed in Table 7.World interest rates rise much less under the
modified McKinnon plan than under the other noncooperative regimes.
We can make a formal comparison of the outcomes of the four regimes by
measuring the intertemporal welfare function, starting in 1984, for all of the
countries given the different adjustment paths. The results of this comparison
are shown below:






Comparing the non-cooperative case with cooperation we see that each
country has a lower loss under cooperation. The dollar standard leads
uniformally to the largest loss. For the U.S. and the ROECD, the McKinnon rule
performs well relative to the non-cooperative case, but -is worse for Japan. The
ranking of non-cooperation and the McKinnon Rule is therefore ambiguous.
The results have shown that national welfare in responding to an
exogenous shock will be altered by the nature of the monetary regime, and that
at least for one shock (a global inflationary disturbance), the symmetric fixed
exchange rate regime envisioned by McKinnon might have some merit. However, it
is extremely inappropriate to draw conclusions about the relative merits of
exchange rate regimes from one type of shock. In the next section, we enrich
the comparison among regimes by using a technique that allows us to examine
regime performance under a variety of disturbances.
VI. Asymptotic Properties of Alternative Regimes
Our second approach to comparing interactions under alternative exchange
regimes uses a technique developed in McKibbin and Sachs [1985), in which we
calculate the steady-state variances of a set of targets when the model is
subject to a range of stochastic shocks, and when national policymakers optimize
their policy choices with respect to a social welfare function. Related
methods have been employed by Currie and Levine [1984]. In the illustration in
this section, the stochastic shocks are included in equations foraggregate
demand, prices and money demand in both the U.S. and ROECD. It is assumed that
in each period the shocks hit after the policies are in place, so that the—44-.
policy choices are not conditioned on the realizations of the disturbances
hitting the system with-in the period.
Under our assumption of an additively separable, quadratic social
welfare function, average operating welfare of aneconomy in a particular
monetary regime can be written in terms of the variances and covariances of the
target variables under the particular regime. The numerical techniques in this
section allow us to determine the asymptotic variance-covariance matrices for
the target variables for each of the countries, and thereby to determine the
average welfare levels of the economies under each of the regimes. For each
regime, we proceed as follows. Optimal rules of adjustment, in the form
u= r' I=U.S.,ROECD, and Japan
are calculated for each country, using the dynamic programming solutions shown
in the previous section of the paper. We may then substitute these rules back
into the structural equations of the model. Given the asymptotic
variance-covar-jance structure of the shocks, we can then solve for the
asymptotic variance—covariance structure of the target variables. Given these
results, it is possible to calculate the asymptotic level of expected welfare
for each country under each regime, by a method described later in this section.
In this way, we can find out which regimes are most attractive independent of
the initial conditions of the economy, in other words, in the long—runoperating
characteristics.
Since the technique is somewhat technical, it is worth spelling out in
some detail, as we now proceed to do. Once again, we begin with the state-space

















We now make several assumptions about the stochastic disturbances.They
all enter additively so certainty equivalence holds. All shocks havepersistent
effects in the model. This is because the shocks enter into dynamicequations
which cause the effects of the shocks to propagate over time. The shocks to the
aggregate demand equation (Ca)areentered explicitly in the following way:
=.' ) +
where becomes part of the state vector X.
The other shocks, although serially uncorrelated, are persistent because of the
dynamic specification of the model: the price shocks are built into a
wage-price spiral in the model, and disturbances to money demand affect future
money demand because of a lagged adjustment specification of the money demand
equation (which makes the future demand for real money balances a function of
the lagged level of real money balances).




Policyrules are written in the form:—46--
U= F1X (10')
whereU -is the stacked vector consisting of the policy instruments of the
individual regions, U ,i=U.S., ROECD, Japan.
t
The policy rule may be the result of an optimization procedure (the case that we
study in this section), or may be chosen by some other arbitrary technique. In
other words, the technique -in the section can be used to analyze each
individual's favorite "optimal" policy rule, whether or not that rule is derived
from a formal optimization procedure.
Given a specification of a policy rule, and given the structural




(This equation can be derived through various procedures, including the
closed-form solutions of Blanchard and Kahn [1981], or by various iterative
techniques, one of which we have developed and used here).









With the system written in the canonical form of a first—order
stochastic difference equation, as in (12), it is straightforward, though
tedious, to calculate the asymptotic variance-covariance structure of the state
variables X. Once these are calculated, it is possible to use the equation for
the target variables T, in order to calculate the variance-covariance matrix of
the target variables.A full description of the numerical techniques used to
get to this point is provided in McKibbin and Sachs E1985].
Once the variance-covariance matrix of the target variables is known, we
can also calculate the expected utility loss given some arbitrary welfare
function.
T tT
Let II =E(TT),andutility U = T WT
t=O
where W is a diagonal matrix with weights for each target along the diagonal.
Then,
T T
E(T WT) =TrE(WTT)= Tr(Wfl). (13)
Thuswe find
E(U) =Tr(Wll)/(].—g3) (14)
Using the procedures just outlined we can now calculate the variance of
targets under the alternative monetary regimes. For each regime, we calculate
optimal policy rules of the form given in equation (10), and then we derive the-48-.
asymptotic variance-covariance structures of the target variables. Rather than
summarizing the results by presenting a single expected welfare level for each
regime, as in the equation (14), we instead report the asymptotic variances of
the key variables, so that the reader can see how well the alternative regimes
do in stabilizing the target variables in the world economy. (For convenience,
the results are actually reported as standard deviations, rather than
variances).
These results are reported in tables 11 to 13, which present the
standard deviations of output, inflation, the current account and the fiscal
deficit in the U.S. and ROECD, given shocks to aggregate demand, prices and
monetary velocity in each of these regions. Each row of numbers in the tables
correspond to the asymptotic standard error of each target when the economy is
subject to a given stochastic shock, within a given monetary regime. Results are
reported for five types of monetary regimes: (1) a pure float, in which no
policy actions are taken in any country (i.e. pure laissez—faire); (2) a
cooperative float, in which all of the instruments in all of the countries are
cooperatively controlled by a central authority, who maximizes a weighted sum of
regional utilities; (3) a noncooperative float, in which monetary and fiscal
policies are selected in a noncooperative way by the macroeconomic authorities
in each of the countries; (4) the simple McKinnon rule, with fixed exchange
rates, and a constant level of global money; and (5) a modified McKinnon rule,
in which the global money is cooperatively controlled, in theway outlined in
Section V.
Consider forexamplethe effects of a unit shock to U.S. aggregate—49—
Table 11: Variance of TarQets Under AQgregate Demand Shocks
U.S. Demand Shock
purecooperative noncooperative McKinnonl McKinnonll
float float float
U.S.
output 2.164 1.534 1.490 3.253 3.197
inflation 0.932 0.539 0.508 1.276 1.221
current 0.678 0.584 0.636 0.590 0.629
account
fiscal o.oio 0.255 0.108 1.518 1.382
deficit
ROE CD
output 1.039 0.729 0.764 0.950 0.995
inflation 0.621 0.433 0.458 0.372 0.525
current 0.557 0.474 0.525 0.497 0.530
account
fiscal 0.002 0.048 0.093 0.506 0.905
deficit
ROECD Demand Shock
pure cooperative noncooperative McKinnonl McKinnonll
float float float
U.S.
output 1.031 0.629 0.627 0.651 0.673
inflation 0.648 0.408 0.406 0.217 0.376
current 0.251 0.236 0.234 0.222 0.352
account
fiscal 0.015 0.053 0.089 0.355 0.803
deficit
ROE CD
output 2.114 1.383 1.382 3.636 3.554
inflation 0.929 0.456 0.456 1.407 1.342
current 0.300 0.319 0.329 0.352 0.498
account
fiscal 0.003 0.037 0.054 1.635 1.168
deficit—50--
demand, under the alternative regimes given in table 11. The standard deviation
of the shock itself is one percent of U.S. GDP (the corresponding shock in the
ROECO has a standard deviation of one percent of ROECD GOP). Under a pure
laissez-faire float, (denoted "flexible exchange rate" in the table), the unit
shock to aggregate demand induces an asymptotic standard deviation in real
output in the U.S. of 2.164 percent of GOP. Under a global cooperative
arrangement, the standard deviation is reduced to 1.534 percent of U.S. GOP. If
the U.S. -is stabilizing by itself, in a noncooperative flexible exchange rate
regime, and if the stabilization is such as to minimize the social welfare
function introduced earlier, then the variability of U.S. GDP due to pure demand
shocks -is reduced still further, to 1.490 percent of U.S. GOP. The shock of
course also induces fluctuations in inflation and in the current account-GOP
ratio (the table records the standard deviation of both of these variables when
measured in percentage points; i.e. the standard deviation of 0.932 in U.S.
inflation, signifies a standard deviation of just under one percentage point of
annual inflation).
The key point in table 11 is that the fixed exchange rate systems
(McKinnon I and McKinnon II) are destabilizing for the real GOPs of both the
U.S. and the ROECD when U.S. aggregate demand is hit by stochastic shocks. In a
floating rate system, some of the demand shock is automatically muted as the
floating rate appreciates, and thereby shifts some of aggregate demand abroad.
Under the McKinnon rule, however, if the U.S. is hit by a positive aggregate
demand shock, the U.S. money supply automatically expands, enough to forestall
any appreciation of the exchange rate. The demand shock is then magnified in—51—
the U.S., as it is amplified by a monetary expansion. Abroad, we have already
seen, the foreign money supply contracts under the rules of the game, and the
foreign economy actually slumps. For this kind of shock, it doesn't really
matter whether the global money stock is fixed (as in the basic McKinnon
proposal) or varied cooperatively (as in the modified McKinnon proposal,
labelled McK-innon II), though it is not clear to us why there is not more gain
to a coordinated monetary response. Note finally, some policy is better than
none, since the cooperative and noncooperative floating rate policies dominate
the laissez-faire response in all cases.
When we turn our attention to price shocks, in table 12, little of this
conclusion is changed. In almost all cases, cooperative or noncooperative
floating is better than either laissez-faire or a fixed exchange rate. This
result is really not surprising, in that a nominal price or wage shock in one
country (due, for example, to a temporary productivity decline, or to wage
militancy, etc.) is best absorbed in the world markets through a depreciation of
the currency of the inflating country. In this way, there is a substantial gain
in the stability of real output, with only a slight decline in the stability of
the inflation rate (note that the Laissez—faire policies and thepure McKinnon
rule have a very slightly lower variance of inflation than do the floating rate
rules).
Why is it that the McKinnon rule seemed stabilizing in the inflation
game of Section V, but seems rather unattractive in the present context? The
reason is that the previous game studied a case in which all countries
simultaneously are faced with a price shock, whereas in table 12, the price—52—
Table 12Variance of Targets Under Price Shocks
U.S. Price Shock
purecooperative noncooperative McKinnonl McKinnonll
float float float
U.S.
output 2.723 1.771 1.783 2.465 2.187
inflation 1.229 1.418 1.418 1.415 1.439
current 0.377 0.266 0.278 0.692 0.670
account
fiscal 0.012 0.083 0.150 1.346 1.111
deficit
ROE CD
output 0.517 0.198 0.185 0.318 0.399
inflation 0.374 0.163 0.157 0.236 0.562
current 0.295 0.212 0.229 0.585 0.578
account
fiscal 0.002 0.119 0.040 0.419 0.812
deficit
ROECD Price Shock
purecooperative noncooperative McKinnonl McKinnonll
float float float
U.S.
output 0.664 0.274 0.230 0.302 0.280
inflation 0.417 0.207 0.176 0.153 0.530
current 0.149 0.134 0.092 0.235 0.469
account
fiscal 0.005 0.118 0.044 0.310 0.758
deficit
ROECO
output 2.972 1.899 1.922 2.952 2.624
inflation 1.281 1.482 1.504 1.637 1.597
current 0.164 0.171 0.139 0.350 0.566
account
fiscal 0.001 0.159 0.202 1.745 1.189
deficit—53
shocks in the U.S. or in the ROECD are considered to beindependently
distributed. This distinction is potentiallyvery important, in that when the
price shocks are independent, it is useful to allow for nominalexchange rate
variability across the countries, while when the shocks are highly correlated,
the need for exchange rate movements is very much reduced, and thebenefits to
reducing cross-country strategic actions that cancel each other out, is likewise
enhanced. For that reason, the methodology in this section is somewhat biased
against a fixed exchange rate system.
Table 13 refers to velocity shocks in themoney demand equations in the
U.S. and the ROECD. Once again, we study the case in which the shocksare
independently distributed. Now we have an interesting, and intuitively
plausible finding: a fixed rate regime stabilizes theeconomy of the country
experiences the monetary shock, but destabilizes the economy of the other
country. Consider concretely what happens when U.S. money demand rises, under
the alternative systems (remember that the shock is unobserved withinthe period
that it occurs). Under floating rates, theeconomy with rising money demand
experiences a currency appreciation and a corresponding decline inaggregate
demand, resulting from the fall in national competitiveness. The other
economies experience either a modest gain or fall in output:competitiveness
improves, but export markets shrink since the economy with risingmoney demand
goes into recession. Now, under a McKinnon rule, the economy with risingmoney
demand would automatically have an accomodating increase inmoney, as the
monetary authority expands money enough to keep the exchange rate pegged. The
other economy, however, would be forced to contract themoney supply under the—54—
Table 13Variance of Targets Under Money Velocity Shocks
U.S. Money Shock
purecooperative noncooperative McKinnonl McKinnonll
float float float
U.S.
output 1.628 1.546 1.550 0.631 0.633
inflation 0.505 0.604 0.607 0.233 0.276
current 0.162 0.168 0.174 0.077 0.063
account
fiscal 0.001 0.041 0.070 0.164 0.019
deficit
ROE CD
output 0.272 0.122 0.126 0.936 0.888
inflation 0.112 0.046 0.048 0.337 0.347
current 0.153 0.162 0.168 0.094 0.081
account
fiscal 0.000 0.055 0.006 0.267 0.060
deficit
ROECD Money Shock
purecooperative noncooperative McKinnonl McKinnonll
float float float
U.S.
output 0.291 0.060 0.039 0.629 0.630
inflation 0.113 0.068 0.055 0.234 0.275
current 0.068 0.058 0.033 0.079 0.063
account
fiscal 0.002 0.071 0.015 0.172 0.019
deficit
ROE CD
output 2.184 1.955 1.976 0.935 0.885
inflation 0.666 0.772 0.787 0.339 0.346
current 0.086 0.068 0.054 0.094 0.081
account
fiscal 0.001 0.086 0.108 0.284 0.060
deficit—55—
rules of the game, so that its economy could begreatly destabilized.
Once again, the conclusions would look much moreappealing to the
McKinnon rule once we allow for a negative correlationacross countries in the
money shocks. Suppose, for example, that the money shocks in the U.S. andROECD
are perfectly negatively correlated. The results for thiscase are given in
table 14. In this case the McKinnon rule is close tobeing perfectly
stabilizing, since the country with expanding money demandautomatically has a
rising money supply, while the country with the contractingmoney demand
automatically has a falling money supply. The other regimes perform farworse
than the McKinnon rule for this particulartype of shock, which indeed is the
type of shock stressed by McKinnon.
A full analysis of the costs and benefits of the alternativesystems
would require a more complete investigation of the covariancestructure of the
underlying shocks, something that we hope to do in future work.
VII. Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the implications of alternativemonetary regimes
in the OECO for the transmission of fiscalpolicy, and for the efficiency of
strategic interactions across the major DECO economies. While the work is
tentative, we have already arrived at several useful conclusions.First, the
nature of fiscal interactions will vary greatly dependingon the nature of the
monetary regime. Under floating exchange rates, transmission of fiscalpolicy
tends to be positive, while under a fixed ratesystem of the sort propounded by
McKinnnon, fiscal policy can actually be negatively transmitted. Inasymmetric—56—
Table 14: Variance of Targets Under Negatively Correlated
U.S. and ROECD Money Shocks
purecooperative noncooperative McKinnonl McKinnonll
float float float
U.S.
output 1.608 1.490 1.518 0.002 0.002
inflation 0.430 0.549 0.569 0.001 0.001
current 0.174 0.188 0.176 0.000 0.000
account
fiscal 0.004 0.111 0.058 0.000 0.000
deficit
ROE CD
output 2.386 2.076 2.101 0.003 0.003
inflation 0.680 0.794 0.812 0.001 0.001
current 0.135 0.173 0.164 0.000 0.000
account
fiscal 0.001 0.141 0.103 0.001 0.000
deficit—57—
monetary systems, such as a dollar standard, u.s. fiscal policymay well be
negatively transmitted, while foreign fiscal policy is almostsurely positively
transmitted to the U.S. These theoretical findingsare supported by simulation
experiments in a large-scale multi-region model of the worldeconomy (the MSG
model). The quantitative estimates show that negativetransmission of fiscal
policy under a fixed exchange rate regime is more than a theoreticalcuriosity,
and is at the least a real empiricalpossibility, if not likelihood.
One of the alleged advantages of a move to fixedexchange rates is that
it would mute the incentives forbeggar-thy-neighbor policies under flexible
exchange rates. We illustrated that proposition in twoways, first using a
simple theoretical model, and then by examining a differentialgame in which the
large three OECD regions all inherit a high inflation rate andthen use
macroeconomic policies in the attempt to pursue anoptimal disinflation. As we
show, the noncooperative floating regime tends to createan incentive towards
fiscal expansion and monetary contraction that isinefficient from the point of
view of the social welfare functions in the individualcountries.
A new methodology is then used at the end, to examine the"average"
operating properties of the alternative systems. The question of whichsystem
is best is shown to depend on which stochasticdisturbances are dominant, a
standard result in the analysis of fixed versus flexiblerates. The results on
the whole are relatively hostile to fixedexchange rates, but that might depend
on our specification of the shocks. As is described in thetext, price shocks
which are positively correlated acrosscountries, or money demand shocks which
are negatively correlated across countries, will both tend to berelatively well
handled by fixed exchange rate regimes.—58--
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Appendix: MSG Model of the World Economy
U.S. Equations
QU =DU+ CU + (C+C+C+C) -
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A Claims on country j held by privatecreditors in country I
B1. Claims on country j held by officialcreditors in country I
B' Government debt of country I
C Consumption by country i of the output ofcountry j
CA Current account
o Domestic absorption
DEBT Developing country debt
DEF Government deficit
E0 Exchange rate (s/ECU)
E Exchange rate ($/yen)
G Government Expenditure
H Real Finani] Wealth
I Nominal interest rate
M Nominal money supply
n Growth rate
P1 Price level of country i goods
Consumer price index
Domestic price inflation
1r Consumer price inflation—68—
Q Grossdomestic product
r Real short interest rate
R Real long interest rate
T Taxes
TB Trade Balance
V Concessiona]real interest rate
A Real exchange rate
Expectation of X41 based on period t information—69—
Parameter Values
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